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Abstract (II3 words) 
Prior research has documented the impact of finn and industry specific variables in shaping the 
post-entry exit probability.  These studies have found  a mixed effect of competition, usually 
proxied by concentration,  upon  exit.  This  paper uses  the  empirical  measure  developed by 
Sundaram,  John  and John  (1996),  which  captures  the  theoretical  notion  of competition  in 
strategic complements versus strategic substitutes. Our results show that the survival of newly 
established firms  is  lower when competition is  in  strategic  complements  and higher when 
competition is  in strategic substitutes. Furthermore, the evidence suggests predation since the 
effect  of competition  depends  upon  the  firm's  financial  structure  and  upon  the  extent  of 
information and incentive problems in financial markets. 
JEL: D43, Lll, Ll3, L40, G32. I. INTRODUCTION 
The impact of  firm and industry specific variables in shaping the post-entry exit probability has 
been documented in numerous studies. These studies typically find a negative relation between 
firm  start-up  size  and  exit,  a  result  that  Troske  (1989),  Geroski  (1995)  and  others  have 
interpreted  as  being  consistent with  the  learning models  from  the  entrepreneurship  and  10 
literatures. These studies further show that diversifying entrants and firms starting with a larger 
number of plants are more likely to  survive (e.g.,  Mata and  Portugal (1994), Audretsch  and 
Mahmood (1995». Next, the evidence indicates that scale economies and industry turbulence 
decrease the  survival chances of entrants whereas sunk costs and industry growth reduce the 
likelihood of post-entry exit (e.g., Audretsch (1995». Finally, post-entry survival also depends 
upon  the  technological  and  knowledge  conditions  in  the  industry,  as  shown  in  Acs  and 
Audretsch (1993), among others. 
Whereas the direction of  the impact of  the above firm and industry level variables is consistent 
across the different studies, this consistency is not found for the impact of competition within 
the industry. 1 A potential explanation for this lack of uniformity may be the way in which the 
competitive  effect  has  been  operationalized.  Most  studies  use  a  measure  of  industry 
concentration to  proxy for the  nature  of competition:  the  CR4  or  CR8  concentration  ratio, 
which takes the market share of  the largest four, respectively eight, firms into account (used in 
Acs and Audretsch (1993), among others) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index, 
which  considers  the  market shares  of all  firms  in  the industry (used  in  Mata and  Portugal 
(1994), Wagner (1994), among others). The underlying idea is that collusion, which alleviates 
competition among  incumbent  firms,  can be achieved and  sustained more  easily  in highly 
concentrated industries (e.g., Chamberlin (1933), Bain (1956), Stigler (1968». The impact of industry collusion upon post-entry survival, however,  is  not  a priori  clear.  On the one hand, 
collusion  may increase the  survival  chances  of entrants  when  the  cartel  cuts  back its  own 
output in response to entry, as the OPEC did during the seventies. Conversely, the likelihood of 
retaliatory conduct against entrants may be greater in a cartel, which is then expected to  lower 
post-entry survival, as  argued in Wagner (1994). Furthermore, theoretical arguments in Tirole 
(1988), Martin (1988) and others point out that whereas firms  in  highly concentrated markets 
are  likely to  recognize their mutual dependence, they may be unlikely to  achieve - tacit or 
overt - collusion unless they produce a standardized product, have the same costs and share a 
common discount rate (i.e.  have the same time preference). In  other words, concentration is  a 
necessary,  but  not  sufficient  condition  for  collusion  and  differences  create  disagreements. 
Empirical  evidence  exists  refuting  the  conjectured  systematic  positive  relation  between 
industry concentration and collusion (e.g., Rosen (1982), Siovin,  Sushka and Hudson (1991), 
Sundaram, John and John (1996». 
From the above discussion, it is clear that traditional concentration measures mask the separate 
influences of competition in strategic complements versus strategic substitutes.2 In response to 
these pitfalls,  Sundaram, John  and John (1996)  created another measure of competition, the 
Competitive  Strategy  Measure  (CSM),  which  captures  the  theoretical  notion  of strategic 
complements  versus  substitutes.  We  apply  this  measure  to  investigate  the  impact  of 
competitIOn  upon  exit  for  a  sample  of  235  true  business  start-ups  from  the  Belgian 
manufacturing industry. We find no competitive effect using the traditional CR4 concentration 
ratio.  On  the  other  hand,  the  CSM  indicates  that  the  likelihood  of exit  increases  with 
I  Doi  (1999),  for  instance,  finds  that  industry concentration is  significantly  negatively  related to  exit, whereas 
Kovenock and  Phillips (1997) find that following their recapitalization, linTIS  in  highly concentrated industries are 
significantly more likely to close plants and less likely to invest. 
, Others use the concept of  conjectural variation to classiJY different types of competition. Conjectural variation is 
delined as the percentage change in its rivals' output that a firm expects in response to a one per cent change in its 
own output (Martin (1988)). A positive value for the conjectural variation parameter corresponds to  competition 
in  strategic  complements,  whereas  a  negative value  for this  parameter corresponds to  competition  in  strategic 
substitutes.  COUl'not  (quantity  setting)  competition  can  generally  be  classified  as  competition  in  strategic 
2 competition in strategic complements, but decreases with competition in strategic substitutes, 
ceteris paribus. We  further refine our tests to demonstrate that the competitive effect depends 
upon  the  entrant's initial financial  structure.  In particular, the extent of industry competition 
has a stronger impact upon exit for entrants that are more highly levered at the time of start-up, 
ceteris paribus. Furthermore, this relation only holds when information and incentive problems 
in  financial markets  are  extensive. An alternative interpretation of the  significant interaction 
term between competition and financial structure, namely that leverage makes firms financially 
vulnerable  in  markets  that  are  characterized  by  hard  competition,  is  therefore  rejected. 
Furthermore,  our  results  are  consistent  with  the  theoretical  models  on  financial  market 
predation by Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Maurer (1999). 
These authors  argue  that when information and incentive problems in financial  markets are 
extensive,  incumbent  firms  may  have  an  incentive  to  predate  such  as  to  influence  the 
perceptions of financiers on the start-up' s quality and/or behavior. 
Our paper not only extends the discussion on predation upon new entrants, but is also related to 
the  growing literature on the  interactions between product market competition and financial 
structure. Brander and Lewis (1986) show that due to limited liability, firms in an oligopolistic 
competitive setting may take on higher leverage in order to  precommit themselves to  a more 
aggressive output strategy. Brander and Lewis (J988) refine the above relation and find that it 
holds only when bankruptcy costs are fixed. Proportional bankruptcy costs, on the other hand, 
lead to  a U-shaped relation between leverage  and  output.  Glazer (1994)  points  out that the 
maturity structure of debt affects product market behavior; in  particular, long-term debt may 
induce collusive behavior in the output market that would not be present if the firms  had no 
debt or if their debt was short-term. Maksimovic (1988) extends the Brander and Lewis (1986) 
model to  consider mUltiple periods of interaction between rival firms and shows that increases 
substitutes,  whereas  Bertrand  (price  setting)  competition  can  be  considered  as  competition  in  strategic 
complements. in  debt make it more difficult for firms to maintain the  collusive and, thus, restricted level of 
industry output3  An  alternative view of the relation between output and financial markets is 
presented by Gertner, Gibbons and Scharfstein (1988), where the information that is  revealed 
in  financial markets may affect competition in the product market. Poitevin (1989) shows that 
the  way in which  infOlmation  is  revealed in  the  capital market,  rather than  the  information 
itself, affects the extent of  industry competition. 
Our  paper  contributes  to  this  literature  by  examining  the  interactions  between  financial 
structure  and  product market  competition  for  the  case  of business  start-ups,  through  their 
impact upon subsequent survival. Prior studies have examined large, listed firms with a diffuse 
ownership  structure.  In  these  firms,  leverage may be  used as  a mechanism to  more  closely 
align the incentives of management with those of shareholders, as  posited by Jensen (1986). 
Agency arguments,  therefore,  could also  provoke  a relation between firm  financial structure 
and  industry competition and the  evidence reported in footnote  3 is  consistent with such an 
interpretation as  well. However, agency problems of equity are not present in start-ups since 
the  management and ownership of these firms  largely coincide. As a result, the relations that 
we  find  cannot  be  induced  by  agency  considerations.  In  fact,  we  demonstrate  that  the 
interactions between financial structure and product market competition are driven by strategic 
behavior, as the above models predict. 
1 The limited empirical work on the relation between financial structure and  product market competition largely 
rejects  the  predictions  of the  Brandcr  and  Lewis  (1986)  model.  Chevalier  (1995a),  for  instance,  finds  that 
following the  announcement of a supermarket leveraged  buyout, the  market  value  of the  recapitalized  chain's 
rivals  increases significantly.  Also,  she finds that de  novo entry and  expansion  by  existing supermarket chains 
become  more  likely  when  a  large  share  of industry  incumbents  undertook  an  LBO.  Chevalier  interprets  her 
findings  as  suggesting that increases  in  leverage lead  to softer product market competition. Chevalier (1995b) 
finds that following a supermarket LBO,  prices in  local markets rise, but only when the LBO firm's rivals are also 
highly levered. On the other hand, when rival firms have low leverage and markets are highly concentrated, prices 
fall  following  the  LBO,  which  suggests  predation.  Phillips  (1995)  examines  four  manufacturing  industries 
subsequent  to  sharp  increases  in  incumbents'  leverage  and  finds  that  in  three  of them,  industry  output  is 
negatively associated with the average industry debt ratio and that recapitalized firms either lose market share or 
fail to gain market share when smaller rivals exit the industry. Also, in their supply relationships, product price is 
positively associated with the debt ratio. In the divergent industry, rival firms have low leverage and entry barriers 
are  relatively  low  (few  scale  economies,  simple  technology).  Finally,  Kovenock and Phillips (1997)  find  that 
following a sharp increase in  leverage, firms in highly concentrated industries are more likely to close plants and 
are less likely to  invest. 
4 The  remainder of the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In the  next  section,  we  discuss  how 
strategic  interactions  in  the  output  market  can  influence  the  survival  chances  of newly 
established firms and how these interactions can be measured by the CSM. In the third section, 
we  describe our sample selection criteria, give some summary statistics on  the  sample firms 
and  discuss  our measurement  of explanatory  and  control  variables.  Next,  we  present  our 
empirical results. The last section concludes this paper and discusses the implications of our 
study for public policy. 
II. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 
Incumbent firms, through their strategic behavior, can influence the survival chances of  newly 
established enterprises. In this section, we  discuss  cooperative and non-cooperative forms  of 
strategic behavior. We  argue that the nature of competitive interactions is  better captured by 
the Sundaram, John and John (1996) CSM than by traditional concentration measures. 
A. Cooperative versus non-cooperative strategic behavior 
When  output  markets  are  imperfect,  contracts  are  incomplete  or  information  is  only 
asymmetric  or  imperfect,  strategic  interactions  in  the  product  market  can  influence  the 
outcome of  firm investment and output decisions. As a result, the strategic behavior of industry 
incumbents can influence the exit risk of (newly established) rival firms.  Carlton and Perloff 
(1994) define strategic behavior as the set of actions that a firm takes to influence the market 
environment so as to increase its profits. In their definition, this market environment consists of 
all factors that influence the market outcome (prices, quantities, profits, welfare), including the 
beliefs of customers and of rivals, the number of actual and potential rivals,  and  the costs or 
speed with which a rival can enter the industry (entry barriers). Cooperative strategic behavior covers the  actions that make it easier for incumbents to  coordinate their efforts  and to  limit 
competitive responses. As a result, this type of behavior raises the profits of all  firms  in the 
market  by  reducing  competition.  NOll-cooperative  strategic  behavior,  on  the  other  hand, 
consists of the actions of a firm that is trying to maximize its profits by improving its position 
relative to its rivals and, therefore, improves the profits of that firm while lowering the profits 
of competing firnls. 
In  this paper, we are particularly interested in the strategies that  firms  can use to  oust (new) 
rivals from the industry, i.e.  non-cooperative strategic behavior, which includes predation. As 
discussed  in  Ordover  and  Willig  (1981),  Fisher  (1990)  and  Bolton,  Brodley  and  Riordan 
(1999),  predatory strategies  cover  all  actions  that  are  profitable  only because  of the  added 
market  power the  predator  gains  from  eliminating,  disciplining  or otherwise  inhibiting the 
competitive conduct of rivals or potential rivals. Predatory pricing, for instance, may result in 
short-tern1 losses for the predator that can be recouped over time when rivals are driven out of 
the industry or potential entrants are scared off. Martin (1988) argues that two conditions must 
be fulfilled in order for a predatory strategy to be successful. First, the predator must be able to 
act  before  its  rivals.  Second,  the  predator must  demonstrate  that  it  will follow  its  strategy 
regardless of the actions of its  rivals (commitment). Therefore, the predator must be  able to 
survive  short-tenn losses longer than can its  rivals.  This implies that among identical firms, 
predation cannot be a credible strategy and could even be classified as irrational behavior. 
Even if differences  exist between the predating firm  and its  rivals, these may not all  lead to 
successful  predation.  Many  early  studies  of predatory  pricing,  for  instance,  describe  the 
predator as  a  large finn  and its  rival  as  a small firm  and argue  or simply assume that large 
finm can afford losses better than small firms during predatory periods (e.g.,  Benoit (1984)). 
This  assumption has been refuted since  it  can be  expected that investors will fund the small 
6 efficient firm if it is not believable that the large firm will continue to incur losses forever (see 
also Fulghieri and Narayanan (1996)). Another argument that has been posited is that instead 
of financiers, customers may also support victims of predation. The reason is  that customers 
are  likely to have an interest in the preys' long-run survival as  these firms reduce the market 
power of the predator (e.g., Easterbrook (1981». Williamson (1977), however, points out that 
the  transaction costs associated with negotiating long-term contingency contracts, which  are 
necessary to curb free-rider problems among (potential) customers, are prohibitive. In addition, 
Bolton,  Brodley  and  Riordan  (1999)  argue  that counter-strategies  that might foil  predation 
rarely go through in a world of imperfect information. 
Later models of predatory behavior argue  that differences in firms'  beliefs about their rivals 
rather  than actual divergences  can also  result  in successful  predation (signaling theories of 
predation). In other words, perceived rather than genuine differences between the predator and 
its rivals may exclude or discipline firms.  Then, one firm (predator) tries to convince its rivals 
that  it  would be  unprofitable  to  remain  in the  industry  by influencing  their  beliefs  about 
expected  future  revenues  or costs.  This  can  be done  through  manipulating  information on 
industry demand or the predator's costs (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts (1982». Such information 
can subsequently change the preys' beliefs about how aggressively the predator will behave in 
the  future.  In the  case of newly  established firms,  entrants  have  no prior (pricing) history 
whereas incumbents have such a record, resulting in a natural asymmetry between the firms. 
Then,  incumbents may have a natural advantage over entrants,  making predation a plausible 
strategy (e.g., test market predation and signal jamming). 
In  markets  with  asymmetric  information  between  firms  and  investors,  successful  predation 
may also result from  influencing the beliefs of financiers  (financial market predation) rather 
than  those  of the firms  themselves,  as  shown  in Fudenberg  and  Tirole  (1986),  Bolton and 
7 Scharfstein (1990) and Maurer (1999). When information and incentive problems in  financial 
markets  are  extensive, financiers  are  likely to  use  mechanisms  that reduce  strategic  default 
incentives  and/or investment incentive problems.  One  such mechanism is  a credible project 
termination  threat  when profits  are  low  to  induce  firms  to  repay their debt  (e.g.,  Gale  and 
Hellwig (1985), Narayanan (1988),  Poitevin (1989),  Innes  (1990),  Dewatripont and Maskin 
(1995))4 By committing to  a strict enforcement of liquidation rights if a firm's performance is 
poor,  financiers  may  be  able  to  impose  financial  discipline  on  fi1111S,  but  at  a  cost  of 
encouraging rivals  to  ensure that the  firm's performance  is  poor.s As  a result, the financial 
vulnerability of some  firms  may be  exploited in  a strategic way to  cause their exit;  through 
predation,  other firms  may reduce victims'  cash flow  and, thus, impair their ability to  meet 
debt service payments. The success of this type of  predation crucially depends on preys having 
limited  access  to  - whether intel11ally  generated or externally contracted - funds  ("shallow 
pockets"),  which  makes  it  hard  for  these  firms  to  sustain  losses.  As  a  result,  industry 
incumbents may have  an  incentive to prey upon  firms  when  information asymmetries  with 
financiers  are  substantial  so  as  to  influence  investors'  beliefs  on  quality  and/or  behavior 
(incentive problems). 
According  to  Bolton,  Brodley  and  Riordan  (1999),  there  are  five  conditions  in  order  for 
financial  market  predation  to  be  a viable  predatory  strategy.  We  argue  that  each  of these 
conditions is  typically fulfilled in  the  case of business start-ups.  A first  condition is  that the 
prey is  highly dependent upon extel11al  financing. Empirical evidence supports this  condition 
for start-ups. Holtz-Eakin, loulfaian and Rosen (1994) find that entrepreneurs on average are 
liquidity constrained whereas  Huyghebaert (2000)  shows  that  newly established ventures  in 
" A similar reasoning applies  for financiers  who  provide equity finance  (venture  capital  in  the  case of newly 
established finns). The finance literature (e.g., Sahlman (1990), Gornpers (1995)) has  demonstrated that venture 
capitalists stage investment contracts  in  order to  curb moral hazard problems.  However, in  Continental Europe, 
venture  capital can  be  raised  only  by  firms  in  specific  industries and venture  capitalists typically  only finance 
firms in the growth stage (Ooghe, Manigart and Fassin (1991), Van Hulle (1998), Black and Gilson (1998)). traditional industries  are  highly levered at  the  time of start-up.  In  addition,  Laitinen (1994) 
argues that initial cash flow generation of start-ups is highly uncertain and potentially negative, 
which  makes  it  highly unlikely  that  internally  generated  funds  are  an  important  source  of 
financing in the first few years after start-up. The second condition is  that the prey's external 
financing depends upon its  initial performance.  There is  substantial evidence  demonstrating 
that  investors  structure  financing  deals  in  different  stages  when  information  and  incentive 
problems are substantial, which makes additional financing dependent upon previous operating 
results  (e.g.,  Abraham  (1997),  Gompers  (1995».  Third,  predation  threatens  the  prey's 
continued financing and viability. Innes (1990), for example,  argues that this will be the case 
when investors have committed to  terminate funding under poor performance. This condition 
usually holds for start-ups. Fourth, the predator understands the prey's dependence on external 
financing  and fifth,  thc predator can  finance  predation internally or has  substantially better 
access to  credit than the prey. The latter condition corresponds to the idea that predators have 
relatively deep pockets (Telser (1966». When compared to  business start-ups,  firms with an 
established track record are likely to have better access to  external  financing  (e.g.,  Diamond 
(1991»  and/or to have larger recourse to internally generated resources. 
B. The Competitive Strategy Measure (CSM) 
As argued by Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), Showalter (1988), Tirole (1988) and 
others, many results from oligopoly theory critically depend upon the type of competition that 
is  assumed to  exist between firms,  i.e.  whether  competition  is  in  strategic  complements  or 
substitutes.  Intuitively, the  idea of strategic complements  is  that competitors match a firm's 
strategic  move and,  thus,  compete  fiercely.  This type of behavior,  therefore,  could also  be 
considered  as  non-cooperative  strategic  behavior.  With  strategic  substitutes,  competitors 
accommodate  a  firm's  strategic  move,  thereby  decreasing  competition  ~ see  our  above 
5  On  the  other hand,  if they commit to a continuing  supply  of funds,  for  instance  by  extending  an  irrevocable 
credit line, they may be  able to deter predation, but  may be encouraging agency misconduct on the part of their 
9 discussion  on  cooperative strategic  behavior.  This  distinction,  however,  IS  not  captured by 
traditional concentration measures. 
Sundaram,  John  and  John  (1996)  operationalize  the  notion  of  competition  in  strategic 
complements versus substitutes by constructing an empirical measure of the responsiveness of 
a firm's marginal profits (i.e., the change in its profits relative to its own output) to  changes in 
its  competitors'  output.  In  other words,  what  determines  competitive  behavior  as  strategic 
complements or substitutes is the sign of the change in a firm's profits with respect to  changes 
in both its  own and its competitors' output. When the CSM is positive, competition is  said to 
be  in  strategic  complements,  whereas  a  negative  CSM  indicates  competition  in  strategic 
substitutes. 
III. SAMPLE 
Our sample consists of 235 true business start-ups from the Belgian manufacturing sector, that 
stmtcd their operations in  1992  and that report positive employment in the  year of start-up. 
Each of these firms  is  protected by limited liability, as  this  is  a requirement for  firms  to be 
obliged to file their financial statements with the National Bank.6 We verified that each firm in 
the sample was a true start-up and not a split-up, diversifying entrant, or other non-true start-up 
(foundation chmter abstract, telephone calls). For each of these firms, we have accounting and 
borrowers. 
"  For  the  year  1991.  we  have  computed  that  77.03% of all  firms  with  positive  employment  (i.e.  have  paid 
employees) in  the  manufacturing industry are protected by limited liability and, therefore, are  legally required to 
file  their financial  statements with the Belgian National Bank. Even though our data set does not fully cover the 
population of firms with paid employees, a primary advantage of  this data set is that information is  available from 
outside the labor market field, for instance on financial structure. 
10 employment data over the  years  1992-1999.  We  have access  to  similar  information on  the 
corresponding four-digit NACE industry incumbents over the time span 1988-1999.7 
This cohort of 235 start-ups is subsequently followed until December 1999 and, conform to the 
literature,  exit is  determined at  the  time the  firm's  employment falls  to  zero  and  does  not 
become positive again in subsequent years (e.g., Wagner (1994), Mata and Portugal (1994)). 
From Table I,  it can be concluded that a substantial number of the firms  in our sample exit 
during  the  first  few  years  after  start-up.  Specifically,  by  the  end  of the  sampling  period, 
48.51 % of the firms are considered as exits. This figure is  only somewhat lower than the exit 
rates reported by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988), Mata and Portugal (1994) and others. 
Table II gives some information on the industry distribution of the sample firms,  respectively 
survival rates. It seems that our sample is over-represented in a few industries, in particular the 
food,  drink  and  tobacco  industry,  the  timber  and  wooden  furniture  industry,  and  the 
manufacture of  paper and paper products; printing and publishing industry. Though, note that 
our sample represents the population of true entrants with paid employees for the year 1992 
and, therefore, our study does not suffer from a sample selection bias (Zmijewski (1984)). 
Our data set of  true business start-ups is well suited to study the effects of  competition because, 
as  argued above,  strategic interactions may be  important when firms  are asymmetric, not so 
much  in  size, but in  terms  of information  and  reputation.  This  asymmetry  is  likely  to  be 
7 Our industry data set covers a wide range of firms that are operating in  Belgium and only considers the Belgian 
activities of foreign firms. Subsidiaries of foreign firms that are incorporated under Belgian law automatically are 
subject to the obligation to file  their financial  statements  (simple and possibly consolidated annual  accounts). 
Since we only consider the simple annual accounts of true Belgian firms,  we also only consider the subsidiaries' 
simple and not their consolidated annual accounts. Next, branches of foreign firms are obliged to file the foreign 
firm's annual accounts with the National Bank and are allowed to file  annual accounts at the branch level (which 
thus only relate to their Belgian activities). The National Bank incorporates the annual accounts of branches in its 
CD-ROMs as far as  the filed accounts  concern  their  Belgian activities.  From  a discussion  with  people at the 
National Bank. it has become clear that only the large branches of foreign firms file  separate financial statements 
with  the  Bank.  Finally,  note  that  Sleuwaegen  and  Dehandschutter  (1991)  find  that  the  degree  of import 
penetration does not have a significant impact upon entry and exit rates in Belgian manufacturing industries. They 
interpret their finding of low import penetration as potentially reflecting a strong preference to  locate in  Belgium 
instead of  exporting to the Belgian market. 
11 especially pronounced between incumbents  and entrants.  At the time of start-up, uncertainty 
about future  cash flow generation can be expected to be relatively high.  Furthermore, unlike 
existing  studies  that define  entry  at  the  plant level,  information  and  incentive  problems  in 
financial  markets  can  be  expected  to  be  more  severe  with  de  novo  entrants  than  with 
diversifying entrants (new plants established by existing firms). Diversifying firms are likely to 
have a reputation in one or more industries, that may carryover to any new industry they enter. 
******************* 
Insert Tables I and II 
******************* 
We  use  the  hazard  rate  methodology  (duration  analysis)  to  model  the  conditional  exit 
probability of business start-ups. In this study, the explanatory variable of specific interest is 
the nature of industry competition. From the above discussion, it has become clear that initial 
financial structure may also  influence the  survival chances of newly established firms:  when 
information  and  incentive  problems  are  substantial,  financiers  are  likely  to  adopt  a  harsh 
liquidation policy for firms  that default to  curb  these problems. The other firm  and industry 
level variables  that are  included are those  earlier studies have found to  influence post-entry 
survival. These variables capture firm start-up size, scale economies, industry turbulence, sunk 
costs and industry growth8 . 9 Finally, we also control for the fact that overall macro-economic 
conditions  may influence post-entry survival,  as  is  done  in  Mata,  Portugal  and  Guimaraes 
(1995),  for  example. In  previous  studies (e.g.,  Wagner (1994),  Audretsch  (1995)),  different 
R Other firm  level  variables that have been included  in  previous studies are  a dummy variable that is  set to one 
when the new plant is  a new firm and zero otherwise (Audretsch and Mahmood (1995)), and the number of  plants 
operated by the firm  (Mata and Portugal (1994)). Since we study true business start-ups, there is no or only few 
cross-sectional variation in these variables, which is the reason why they will be ignored in this study. 
')  There  is  also  evidence that post-entry  survival  is  influenced by the  underlying  technological  regime  in  the 
industry, as shown in  Acs and Audretsch (1993), among others. In markets where innovative activity is dominated 
by  large  enterprises  (rolltini=ed technological  regime),  the process of firm  selection  can  be  characterized as  a 
revolving door, where the bulk of new entrants exit the industry within a short period following entry. Conversely, 
in  some industries. new entrants may be  at a technological advantage (entrepreneurial technological regime) and 
displace  incumbent  firms  following  entry  by  driving  them  out  of the  market.  Unfortunately,  we  have  no 
information  available  that  could  be  used  to  proxy  for  the  industry  technological  regime.  However,  Acs  and 
12 cohorts  of  entrants  are  followed  over  time,  while  we  examine  only  a  single  cohort. 
Consequently, the  aging pattern  of the  firms  in  our sample may be entangled  with overall 
industry  and/or macro-economic  effects.  When  these  are  not  fully  captured  by our control 
variables, a spurious aging pattern might result. As the interest of our model lies in identifying 
the impact of  competition upon exit, we do not estimate an aging pattern. A similar approach is 
adopted in Mata and Portugal (1994) and Audretsch and Mahmood (1995). 
Hereafter, we discuss our measurement of firm and industry level variables. To  measure firm 
start-up size,  we  use  the logarithm of the  number of employees  in  the  start-up  year. Initial 
financial structure is measured by the firm's leverage, i.e. debt relative to total resources in the 
start-up year. IO  The industry minimum efficient scale (MES) is  proxied by the  median of the 
logarithm of the number of employees of firms older than ten years in the corresponding four-
digit NACE industry  for  the  year  1991  (scale  economies)  1 I  By  considering only  the  older 
finns in the industry, this variable takes into account that entry may occur at a small scale and 
that entrants that discover themselves to be efficient may grow towards the MES. Furthermore, 
Biggadike (1979) and McDougall et al.  (1994) find that after eight years, new ventures begin 
to resemble the characteristics of established firms, which is the reason why we consider firms 
older than  ten  years  as  the  established  firms  in  the  industry  (see  also  Acs  and  Audretsch 
(1993». Industry turbulence is proxied by the extent of gross entry in the industry (entry rate) 
and by the proportion of firms that are smaller than the industry MES (size distribution), both 
measured in  1991. Mata and Portugal (1994) argue that the latter variable can be considered as 
a measure for turbulence that controls for market size. Also, industries that are characterized by 
Audretsch  (1989)  show  that the  extent  and  nature  of innovative  activity  is  directly  related  to  the  amount  of 
turbulence in an industry, for which we control in our study. 
10  To calculate total resources in the start-up year, we undo the balance sheet of the first accounting year from the 
proceeds realized during the first year,  i.e. we remove retained earnings and reserves built up.  Also, balance sheet 
items that do  not correspond to  flows  of moncy (e.g., surplus values from  revaluation, provisions, etc.) are not 
considered as a source of financing. Finally, loans extended by the entrepreneurs to their firm  are not considered 
as debt, but rather as equity financing since it can be argued that this debt is like a form of  preferred equity finance 
(see Huyghebaert (2000)). 
13 high gross entry are  likely to  be the ones where it is hard for  entrants to  obtain an enduring 
presence in the market. Sunk costs are proxied by the fraction of total assets that is  represented 
by  machinery  and  equipment  in  the  industry  for  the  year  1991.  When  machinery  and 
equipment represent a  relatively large  fraction  of total  assets,  the  liquidation  value  of firm 
assets  can be expected to  be rather low,  ceteris  paribus.  To  measure the  extent of industry 
competition,  we use both the  industry CR4  concentration  ratio  and the  CSM.12  In  order to 
construct the latter variable, data is needed on the profits and the output of the firms in a given 
industry. These are proxied by net income, respectively sales, in line with Sundaram, John and 
John (1996). We define the set of competitors of a given firm as all firms in the corresponding 
four-digit  NACE  industry  except for  the  considered  firm.  A  firm's  marginal  profit then  is 
measured as the ratio of the change in its net income LlJ]f to the change in its sales LlSf.  Next, 
we derive the change in its competitors' output LlSe and, conform to Sundaram, John and John 
(1996),  compute the  coefficient of correlation between LlIIflLlSf and !.ISe  over all  firms  in  a 
given industry.13  Industry growth is  assessed by means of historical  (one  year lagged) sales 
growth, averaged across all firms in that particular industry. We allow industry growth rates to 
vary from year to year.  Finally, business cycle effects are gauged by means of time varying 
(TV)  one year lagged real GNP growth.  To limit the influence of outliers,  explanatory and 
II To control for the fact that some industry incumbents may have zero employment, one  is  added before taking 
the logarithm of  employment in  our measures of firm size. 
11  In  other studies.  some  pitfalls  may  have  been  associated  with  measuring concentration,  which  might  also 
explain why these studies find  no systematic impact of  competition (concentration) upon exit.  In particular, many 
concentration measures are biased because of an improper definition of the relevant market. According to Martin 
(1988), the economic market for  a product should include all  goods that significantly influence the price of that 
product.  If transport costs  are  very  high,  then  the  relevant economic market  is  the  local  market  and  national 
concentration statistics may wrongly understate market concentration. Similarly, concentration measures are often 
biased because they ignore imports.  Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1991) argue that Belgium is  a small open 
economy, which has  implications for measuring concentration.  As Belgium is  a small economy, the distinction 
between  local  and  national  markets  may  be  less  pertinent,  particularly  when  examining  start-ups  in 
manufacturing.  As  Belgium  is  an  open  economy,  it  is  necessary  for  this  study  to  have  imports  included  in 
measures of industry sales (see footnote 7).  In sum, traditional concentration measures in our study are less likely 
to suffer from  the  above discussed biases. This makes  it  particularly  interesting to  also  investigate the  relation 
between industry concentration and post-entry exit in our study. 
IJ Sundaram, John and John (1996) compute a CSM per firm using data on the preceding 40 quarters for each firm 
to study the announcement effect of R&D spending. In our study, we  consider entrants that have no track record 
and. therefore, compute this CSM  at the industry level.  In  other words, we consider each firm  separately, identify 
its  competitors and then  calculate the  correlation coefficient between !'.rr';!'.sf and !'.S' over all firms  in  a given 
four-digit NACE industry. 
14 control variables  are  winsorized  at  the  1-99%  percentiles.  In  Table  III,  we provide  some 
summary statistics on explanatory and control variables, whereas in Table IV,  we present the 
pairwise correlations among these variables. 
In Table III, we observe that the sample firms  are rather small: on average, they employ 3.67 
persons (median of two) in the year of start-up, whereas total resources amount to  318674 €. 
Next,  the start-ups in our sample are highly levered, which is  likely to  make them extremely 
vulnerable to predation. On average, 73% of initial resources come under the form of external 
debt financing, whereas the median even points to a higher share of external debt as a source of 
capital. The variable  representing scale  economies  shows that in  the  average  industry,  the 
median firm older than ten years employs 13.84 people. Also, this firm's total assets amounts 
to 969836 €. From the industry entry rate, it can be concluded that industry turbulence in our 
sample is  rather limited:  in the average industry,  firms that start operations during the  year 
1991  represent 6.41 % of the firms that are active at the beginning of that year. The industry 
size distribution shows that on average, 63.64% of the active firms have a smaller scale than 
the industry MES (employment). Industry machinery and equipment represent 8.16% of total 
assets in the average industry. Finally, the CR4 concentration ratio shows that the industries in 
our sample on average are relatively highly concentrated (mean CR4 of 0.3208), whereas the 
CSM indicates that in the average industry, competition is in strategic complements (a positive 
value of  0.0433 for the CSM). The distribution of  the CSMin our study is highly comparable to 
that in the original study by Sundaram, John and John (1996). 
From Table N, it can be concluded that the  competition variables,  CR4  and CSM,  measure 
different aspects of  market structure. When comparing their correlation with the other industry 
level variables, we find that the CR4 concentration ratio is significantly negatively correlated 
with the variables that represent the industry size distribution and the extent of sunk costs. This 
15 indicates that in industries where a substantial number of firms are operating below the MES 
and in industries where machinery and equipment represent a relatively high fraction of total 
assets, market structure is less  concentrated. The CSM, on the other hand, is significantly and 
positively related to the variables scale economies, entry rate and sunk costs. So, in industries 
characterized by important scale economies, substantial entry and high sunk costs, competition 
among  incumbent  firms  is  much  fiercer.  Also,  note  the  relationship  between  the  CR4 
cOllcentration  ratio  and  the  CSM  in  our  sample:  when  industries  are  highly concentrated, 
competition  is  tough;  the  correlation coefficient between these  two variables  amounts  to  a 
highly significant p  =  0.3257.  To  conclude,  note  that the pairwise  correlations in Table IV 
suggest  that multicollinearity is  not  likely to  be  a  problem  in  our study since  none  of the 
correlation coefficients is greater than 0.7, which is the cutoff rule recommended by Judge et 
al. (1988). 
********************* 
Insert Tables III and N 
********************* 
N. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
To  study the  instantaneous  probability of exit,  conditional upon  survival  until  that  period 
(hazard rate), we use duration analysis - see Mata and Portugal (1994), Van de Gucht (1994) 
and  Audretsch  (1995)  for  a  discussion  of the  methodology.  The  main  advantages  of this 
methodology for our study are  that survival analysis can include time varying covariates and 
that  it  takes  into  account  that  start-ups  that  have  survived  the  sampling period  (censored 
observations) may still exit later on.  Since we are not particularly interested in estimating the 
aging pattem, as was argued in the previous section, we assume that the event time follows an 
16 exponential distribution.14  The various models reported in Table V mainly differ with respect 
to the measurement of the competitive effect. We start by discussing the results in Part 1.  The 
effect of competition in Model A is captured by the CR4 concentration ratio, whereas the CSM 
is used in Model B. 
The results of Models A and B in Part 1 indicate that firms starting up  with more employees 
are  significantly less  likely to  exit in the  years following start-up.  This finding is consistent 
with earlier empirical evidence. However, from this study, we cannot tell whether we observe a 
learning effect or an inherent size disadvantage for the smaller start-ups in the sample; given 
that we control for the industry MES, firms that start up at a larger size may just as well find it 
easier to survive as  scale diseconomies can be expected to be less detrimental for larger start-
ups. Next, we observe that highly levered firms are significantly less likely to exit, a result that 
conflicts  with  the  arguments  made  in  section  two.  A  possible  explanation  for  this 
counterintuitive relation between initial leverage and exit might be the  positive relation that 
exists between the variables start-up size and leverage (see Table IV). Unlike other studies that 
define entry at the plant level, firm start-up size, being a discrete variable, exhibits relatively 
few cross-sectional variability in our sample of de novo entrants. Then, the variable leverage 
may capture better genuine size differences across firms. To test for this hypothesis, we use the 
logarithm of  total assets as the metric to express firm size (start-up size and scale economies), 
which is the variable used in the finance  literature. 15  These results are represented in Part 2 of 
Table V (Models A and B).  We indeed find that the relation between firm leverage and exit is 
no longer significant. The results with respect to the other variables are unaffected in Models A 
and B, which is the reason why we concentrate on Part 2 of  this Table henceforth. 
,<  Even ifthere is an aging pattern, this operationalization is unlikely to bias parameter estimates as we control for 
the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity using the gamma distribution. Next, given that ordered probit 
and log it models are less sensitive to the presence of  individual heterogeneity (Han and Hausman (1990», we also 
have estimated an ordered logit model and find that our results are robust. 
17 Unlike other studies (e.g., Audretsch (1991), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Models A and 
B indicate that scale economies have no significant impact upon new firm survival. This might 
result from new entrepreneurial ventures being active in particular market niches, as argued by 
Caves and Porter (1977), among others.  Then, local conditions in those niches may be more 
important to the survival of newly established firms.  This conclusion is  likely to be reinforced 
by the results of Acs and Audretsch (1989), Evans and Siegfried (1992) and others, who find 
that entry is not substantially deterred in industries where scale economies are important. Next, 
we  find that in  both models, the industry entry rate is  positively and significantly related to 
post-entry  exit,  which is  consistent with  our  earlier arguments  on industry  turbulence.  The 
variables  that  capture  the  industry  size  distribution  and  sunk  costs,  however,  are  not 
significantly related to the likelihood of exit. When comparing the impact of competition upon 
exit across the two models, we find that the CR4 concentration ratio is not significantly related 
to post  -entry exit (Model A). This result is  not surprising, given our earlier discussion on tlle 
shortcomings of traditional concentration ratios.  In  particular, these measures  of competition 
generally  mask  the  separate  influences  of strategic  complements  versus  substitutes.  When 
using the CSMto proxy for the nature of  industry competition (Model B), we find that start-ups 
are significantly more likely to exit from their industry when competition is  aggressive rather 
than accommodating, ceteris paribus.  16 Finally, we find that when industry sales growth or real 
GNP growth  is  high,  firms  are  significantly less  likely to  exit.  Start-ups  apparently  find  it 
easier to survive in fast growing industries or during periods of  economic expansion. 
To  examine more thoroughly the impact of competition upon post-entry survival,  we  present 
some additional models. We first create separate variables for when competition is  in strategic 
15  Also, when we discretize the variable leverage using five dummy variables, we find that there is no independent 
leverage effect upon exit and  that the variable start-up size (logarithm of employees) becomes more negatively 
(and more significantly) related to exit. 
16  The fact  that we find  that the entrants in  our sample suffer from  aggressive reactions from  incumbents  is  not 
surprising:  from  the  69  firIns  that  responded  to  a  questionnaire  that  was  sent  out,  31.8%  indicate  that they 
18 complements versus  substitutes.  The results of Model C indicate that the  competitive effect 
holds under both types of strategic interactions, even though the parameter estimate associated 
with  strategic  substitutes  (CSM if negative)  has  a  larger  value  than  that  associated  with 
strategic complements (CSM if  positive).  Though,  the null hypothesis of identical parameter 
estimates cannot be rejected at  a  =  0.10, but lies at the boundary of the rejection region (p-
value of 0.1155). Interestingly, Model D shows that the interaction term between the  CSM and 
the entrant's initial leverage is  significantly positively related to exit, whereas the simple CSM 
term becomes insignificantly related to  exit.  From comparing the log-likelihood value across 
Models Band D, we observe that this interaction term has high explanatory power. Together, 
these findings reveal that the interaction between the nature of industry competition and the 
firm's  initial  financial  structure  is  highly important for  explaining post-entry survival.  This 
result could be driven by financial market predation. Then, highly levered firms are especially 
vulnerable  to  non-cooperative  interactions  within  the  industry.  High  leverage  reduces  both 
operating and financing flexibility,  thereby enhancing the probability of default (e.g., Wruck 
(1990),  Jensen  (1993)).  Model  E,  lastly,  supports  the  idea  that  highly  levered  firms  are 
especially vulnerable to non-cooperative actions by industry incumbents as only the interaction 
term between CSM if  positive and leverage is  significantly different from zero. However, the 
null hypothesis of identical parameter estimates for  the variables CSM If  positive * leverage 
and CSM if  negative * leverage cannot be rejected (p-value of 0.3701).  From comparing the 
log-likelihood value across Models D and E, we can conclude that Model D, which does not 
impose the restriction that the interaction term goes through the origin, has highest explanatory 
power. Finally, from comparing Models A to E, we  can conclude that the results for the firm, 
industry and economy-wide variables are largely insensitive to the measurement of competitive 
conditions.  Though,  when  allowing  for  a separate  impact of strategic  interactions  (strategic 
complements  versus  substitutes),  we  find  some  weak  evidence  that  when  firm  assets  are 
experienced  aggressive  reactions  from  industry  incumbents  following  entry.  18.2%  of firms  even  assign  the 
highest score that could be given on the scale to this item. 
19 relatively sunk,  start-ups are less likely to  subsequently exit from  the industry.  This result is 
consistent with the argument of Dixit and Pindyck (1996) that the  option value of waiting is 
important under these circumstances. 
************* 
Insert Table V 
************* 
Interaction terms, however, do  not allow to make inferences on  the causality of relationships. 
An  alternative explanation for the  above significant interaction term  CSM * leverage (Model 
D), therefore, may be that the leverage effect depends upon the nature of industry competition. 
This could occur when financiers are likely to decide in favor of liquidation following default 
when competition is  severe simply because it has become clear that the  firm's prospects are 
rather dim,  without this being a matter of predation. The reason is  that in highly competitive 
industries, firms cannot earn more than a normal rate of return on their invested capital. Firms 
that are more highly levered at start-up then may be more likely to  default and, therefore, be 
liquidated  by  their  financiers.  Model  E  then  could  be  considered  as  consistent  with  this 
alternative  explanation as  only the  interaction term  between  CSM if  positive * leverage  is 
significant.  The  following  tests  are  set up to  disentangle  the  predation  hypothesis  from this 
alternative  hypothesis. We investigate whether the above results continue to  hold both under 
small  versus  potentially  severe  information  and  incentive problems  at  the  time  of start-up. 
Financial  market predation  models  suggest  that especially when  information  and  incentive 
problems  in  financial  markets  are  substantial,  rival  firms  have  an  incentive  to  engage  in 
predation so as  to influence investors' perceptions on the quality and/or behavior of the firm. 
Conversely, when the alternative hypothesis best describes the underlying process, we  should 
find that the interaction term is  significant, independent of information and incentive problems 
at start-up. 
20 In Table VI, we examine how risk shifting problems affect our above conclusions. We argue 
that risk shifting incentives are especially high for  firms that are likely to fail  and have liquid 
assets.  Entrepreneurs have typically invested a substantial part of personal wealth and human 
capital  in  their firm  and,  therefore,  can be  expected  to  be relatively risk  averse  during the 
nonnal course of  their business. However, once their firm is heading towards financial distress, 
entrepreneurs may face huge incentives to shift risks to  external creditors in order to tum the 
tide.  After all, asymmetric or imperfect information makes it impossible for creditors to  write 
enforceable  state  contingent  contracts,  that  could  have  circumvented  these  problems. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that risk shifting is especially problematic when asset liquidity is 
high,  ceteris  paribus.  Wen  assets  in  place  have  a  relatively  high  liquidation  value, 
entrepreneurs  will  find it easier to  raise  cash  by selling firm  assets.  As  a result,  it can be 
expected that financiers will be largely concerned about risk shifting incentives when the ex 
ante  likelihood  of default  and  the  liquidation  value  of assets  are  high,  ceteris  paribus. 
Therefore,  we  use  the  interaction  term  between  the  ex  ante  likelihood  of failure  and  the 
liquidity of firm assets to classify the firms in our sample on the basis of the ex ante potential 
for risk shifting problems. We first split the sample using the 50% percentile, i.e. the median. 
In addition, we  also report results for firms with a value below the  40% and above the 60% 
percentile of the variable industry failure risk * industry asset liquidity. The ex ante likelihood 
of failure is measured by the industry failure (bankruptcy) risk of entrants founded over 1988-
1991, which then are tracked over a three year period following entry.  This measure can be 
readily  assessed  by  external  financiers.  Liquidity  of firm  assets  is  proxied by  the  ratio  of 
accounts receivable, cash and marketable securities relative to total assets, averaged across all 
firms in the corresponding four-digit NACE industry. 
Our empirical results in Table VI indeed indicate that the interaction term between  the  CSM 
and  leverage has  a significant positive impact upon exit, but only when the ex  ante potential 
21 for risk shifting is substantial, i.e.  when the risk shifting measure is  above the median. 17  The 
result trom a t-test indicates that the parameter estimates for CSM * leverage are significantly 
different across the two subsamples of  firms with a value below, respectively above the median 
of the  variable  industry failure  risk * industry  asset  liquidity  (p-value  of 0.0973).  This 
conclusion  is  reinforced  when  comparing  the  parameter  estimates  for  the  subsamples  in 
columns one (below 40% percentile) and four  (above 60% percentile). Next, we find that the 
negati  ve  size effect is highly important for explaining the likelihood of  post-entry exit both for 
all  subsamples  of fimls.  Finally,  we  find  that  the  above  documented  industry  effects  are 
significant  only for  firms  with  substantial information  and incentive problems  in  financial 
markets  at  start-up.  This  result could be  explained by the binding financial  constraints  that 
these firms  are  likely to  face, making it more difficult to overcome inherent disadvantages at 
the industry level. 
In Table VII, we use the interaction term between the ex ante likelihood of failure and growth 
opportunities to classify the sample firms in order to  examine the impact of  risk shifting and/or 
underinvestment incentives on our earlier conclusions from Table V.  Growth opportunities at 
start-up are proxied by the historical industry growth rate in total assets over 1988-1991. It can 
be  argued  that  when  growth  opportunities  are  substantial  and  when,  due  to  information 
problems, state-contingent contracts cannot be written, firms may underinvest and/or may find 
it easier to  engage in risk shifting (by redirecting the firm's assets towards  other ends  when 
exercising investment options). Again, as  discussed in the previous paragraph, these incentive 
problems can be expected to be most problematic when the firm  is  heading towards financial 
distress. Our empirical results indicate that the positive parameter estimate of CSM *  leverage 
becomes  larger  (and  more  significant)  when  ex  ante  information  and  incentive  problems 
17  We  have checked whether the cross-sectional variation of  the variable CSM • leverage is  different across both 
subsamples (below versus above the median of  the variable that proxies for risk shifting incentives), which might 
also explain our finding. However, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of identical degrees of diversity (p-value of 
0.9999 when using an F-test). 
22 increase.  However,  a  t-test  indicates  that  the  parameter  estimates  for  the  variable  CSM * 
leverage are not significantly different even across the subsamples of firms with a value below 
the 40% percentile, respectively above the 60% percentile of the variable industry failure risk * 
induslly growth opportunities (p-value of 0.1532). Again, we  find that industry level variables 
have a significant impact upon exit only for the  firms  with  large  information and incentive 
problems at the time of start-up. 
********************** 
Insert Tables VI and VII 
********************** 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The importance of market power, which is the ultimate goal of predation, has been the subject 
of a  long  and  still  ongoing  debate  between  economists  who  lean  towards  the  Structure-
Conduct-Performance school and  advocates of the  Chicago  school.  The first  group  believes 
that the (private) exercise of  market power by firms  is a persistent feature of many markets and 
argues that strategic behavior can be used to acquire and maintain the ability to set price above 
marginal cost. The Chicago school, on the other hand, argues that every firm decision or action 
can be  duplicated by an  equally efficient firm,  unless  some  higher power intervenes.  Those 
economists who adhere to this school contend that private market power can only be temporary 
and that government interference in the market - through blockading entry - is the only source 
of sustained monopoly power. 
In  this paper, we find support for the theoretical argument that industry incumbents engage in 
predatory practices so  as  to  influence the perceptions of financiers.  In particular, we  find that 
the  impact  of competition,  which  is  measured  by  the  Sundaram,  John  and  John  (1996) Competitive Strategy Measure, upon exit depends upon the entrant's initial financial structure. 
Furthermore, we also observe that this effect is only important when information and incentive 
problems  in  financial markets  are  extensive.  These findings,  therefore, have some important 
consequences  for  the effective functioning of markets.  Entry of new  competitors  is  essential 
not  only  for  introducing  new  products  and  processes,  but  also  for  enforcing  competitive 
discipline  on  markets.  Since  we  examine  entrants  in  traditional  manufacturing  industries, 
which  typically  are  more  evolved  in  their  industry  life  cycle,  the  imposition  of market 
discipline is  likely to be a major contribution of entry. 18  When scale economies provide large, 
established firms already with an advantage when compared to  small scale start-ups - perhaps 
because they find it difficult to secure external funds - it may be difficult for entrants to obtain 
an enduring presence in the market. Likewise, under these circumstances, entrants may find it 
hard to  impose discipline on  industry incumbents, which, according to  the Chicago School, is 
necessary  to  curb  incumbent  market  power.  Post-entry  survival  may  become  even  more 
burdensome when industry incumbents engage in predation. Learning-by-doing similarly can 
place entrants  in an unfavorable starting position.  In sum, scale  economies  and  leaming-by-
doing may even become larger entry barriers  in the presence of predation.  The  detection of 
predatory behavior in our study, therefore, inevitably has implications for public policy. 
Martin (1988)  argues that the  study of predation by economists has  largely consisted of the 
formulation or criticism of rules offered to courts for use in deciding on antitrust cases, which 
makes us  extremely wary when formulating implications for antitrust policy, i.e. the policy by 
which  the  government  sets  the  rules  according  to  which  independent  firms  compete.  A 
frequently  adopted  decision rule  by courts  in the  U.S.  is  that  there  is  evidence  in  favor  of 
predation  when  the  price is  below short-run  marginal  cost,  which then  is  approximated by 
18  In  the early stage of  the industry life cycle, firms enter essentially by introducing innovations that are embodied 
in  new products or processes and while some are successful and prosper, a large number never acquire  buyers' 
acceptance  and  quickly  leave the  market.  In  the  later stages  of the  industry  life  cycle,  industries  can  still  be 
24 average variable cost (known as the Areeda-Turner rule). Though, our main critic also applies 
to  this rule:  it is  not necessary for established firms to price below short-run marginal cost if 
entrants have higher marginal costs (suffer from diseconomies of scale or are at the beginning 
of  the learning curve, which may be triggered by financial constraints). 
Setting a price above the incumbent's short-run marginal cost, but below the entrant's marginal 
cost may be profitable only because of its negative impact on the survival chances of existing 
or potential entrants, which in essence is what predation is about. Under these conditions, it can 
seem as if competition is doing its work even though consumers may not be better off in the 
long-run. Therefore, we adhere to the adoption of  a "Rule of Reason Approach", as posited by 
Scherer (1974). This rule takes the relative cost positions of different rivals, scale economies, 
etc. into account and, therefore, recognizes that predation is  a multifaceted phenomenon, that 
cannot be identified by a single factor.  By collecting information on all  relevant economic 
factors, the likelihood of a bias in the  direction of a conservative or populist position can be 
minimized (see De Bondt (2000)). Even though administrative costs associated with this rule 
are likely to be substantial, a correct application of this rule can be expected to deter predation 
in the long-run and, thus, making administrative costs an unlikely expense. 
technologically intensive, but Agarwal and Audretsch (1998) show that entry is  less about radical innovation and 
more about filling strategic niches. 
25 Table 1:  Timing of exit 
This Table represents the number of start-ups that exit at a given age (completed observations), respectively that 
survive until a given age and on which no subsequent data is available on exit/survival (censored observations). 
Age=l  Age=2  Age=3  Age=4  Age=5  Age=6  Age=7  Age=8  Total 
Exited firms  42  45  2  8  14  3  a  a  114  (completed observations) 
Survived firms  a  0  0  0  0  31  69  21  121 
(censored observations) 
Table II: Industry distribution of  exit 
This Table represents for each two-digit NACE industry, the number of sample firms that start up in that industry 
and the number of  firms that are considered as exits, respectively survivors. 







Production and preliminary processing of  metals 
Extraction of minerals other than metalliferous and 
energy-producing minerals; peat extraction 
Manufacture of  non-metallic mineral products 
Chemical industry 
Manufacture  of  metal  articles  (except  for 
mechanical,  electrical  and  instrument  engineering 
and vehicles) 
32  Mechanical engineering 
34  Electrical engineering 
36  Manufacture of other means of  transport 
37  Instrument engineering 
41142  Food, drink and tobacco industry 








Leather  and  leather  goods  industry  (except 
footwear and clothing) 
Footwear and clothing industry 
Timber and wooden furniture industries 
Manufacture of paper and paper products; printing 
and publishing 
Processing of  rubber and plastics 


























































121 Table III:  Summary statistics on explanatory and control variables 
This Table represents the summary statistics for the variables used in this study. Firm slarl-up size is measured in 
terms of  the number of employees, total resources and total assets in the start-up year, leverage is the ratio of total 
debt to total resources in  the start-up year, the  industry MES  (scale  economies)  is  proxied by the  median of the 
number of employees, respectively total assets of  firms older than ten years in the corresponding four-digit NACE 
industry in  1991, enll}' rale is the gross entry rate in the corresponding industry in the year 1991, size distribution 
is  the proportion of firms that are smaller than the corresponding industry MES (employment) in  the year 1991, 
slIl1k costs are proxied by the fraction of  total assets that consist of  machinery and equipment in the corresponding 
industry for the year 1991, the CR4 concenlration ralio represents the market share of  the largest four tirms in the 
corresponding industry  and  CSM measures  the  responsiveness  of marginal  protits  with  respect  to  changes  in 
competitors' output in the corresponding industry. 
Variable  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Std. dev 
Firm level variables 
Start-up size (employment)  3.6681  2  J  38  4.8798 
Start-up size (total resources)  318674€  J40530€  102J3€  8505081€  703696E' 
Start-up size (total assets)  305985€  J41175€  7933€  8505875€  686508€' 
Leverage  0.7300  0.8158  0.0395  0.9930  0.2249 
Industa level variables 
Scale economies (employment)  13.8433  8.5  1  223  23.5773 
Scale economies (total assets)  969836€  390960€  92142€  20968446€  2418310E' 
Entry rate  0.0641  0.0543  0  0.3077  0.0503 
Size distribution  0.6364  0.6355  0.4074  0.8088  0.0821 
Sunk costs  0.0816  0.0779  0  0.2216  0.0514 
CR4 concentration ratio  0.3208  0.3277  0.0995  0.8989  0.1989 
CSM  0.0433  0.0447  -0.1826  0.5142  0.1093 
27 Table TV:  Correlation matrix 
This Table represents the correlations among the variables used  in this study. start-lip size is the  logarithm of the  number of employees in the stal1-up year, leverage is the ratio of 
total  debt  to  total  resources  in  the  stal1-up  year,  scale economies are  proxied  the  median  of the  logarithm  of the  number  of employees  of finns  older than  ten  years  in  the 
corresponding four-digit NACE industry in  1991, entlJl rate is the gross entry rate in the corresponding industry in the year 1991. size distribution is the proportion of firms that are 
smaller than the con'esponding industry MES  in the year  1991, sunk costs are proxied by the fraction of total assets that consist of machinery and equipment in the corresponding 
industry for the year  1991, CR4 represents the market share of the largest tour firms  in the corresponding industry and CSM measures the responsiveness of marginal profits with 
respect to changes in competitors' output in the corresponding industry. 
Start-up size (employment) 
Leverage 






.  significant at  10% 
**: significant at 5% 











Leverage  Scale 
economies 
1.0000 
0.0377  1.0000 
-0.0212  -0.2071 *** 
0.0538  0.1880*** 
0.0075  0.3138*** 
-0.0453  0.0662 
-0.0355  0.2105*** 
Entry rate  Size  Sunk costs  CR4  CSM  1  distribution 
1.0000 
0.2228***  1.0000 
-0.0545  0.2493***  1.0000 
-0.0396  -0.2974***  -0.1937***  1.0000 
0.2144***  -0.0486  0.1648**  0.3257***  1.0000 
28 Table V:  Regression Results for Differcnt Model Specifications 
The sample period is  1992-1999. All data are obtained from the Belgian National Bank. The various models mainly diner with respect to the specification of the competitive effect. 
The finn level variables that are included are measured during the start-up year, whereas the industry level variables are measured in the year preceding entry (1991). start-up size is 
the logarithm of the number of  employees (Part I), respectively total assets (Part 2), leverage is the ratio of  total debt to total resources, scale economies are proxied the median of 
the  logarithm of the number of employees (Part 1), respectively total assets (Part 2) of firms older than ten years in the corresponding four-digit NACE industry, entry rate is the 
gross entry rate in the corresponding industry, size distribution is the proportion of  finns that are smaller than the industry MES, sunk costs are proxied by the fraction of  total assets 
that consist of machinery and  equipment in the corresponding industry, the CR4 concentration ratio represents the market share of the  largest four  firms  in  the  industry,  CSM 
measures the responsiveness of marginal profits with respect to changes in competitors'  output in  the  industry, sales growth is  the one year lagged sales growth rate,  which  is 
allowed to vary over time and real GNP growth is the one year lagged growth rate in real GNP, which is also time varying (TV). 
h" (h,,<eline exit rate) 
Firm level varia hIes 
Start-lin <i7e 
Levera!!e 
Inrlll<trv level v"ri"hle< 
Scale 
F.ntrv rate 
Size disti '!Jution 
Sunk costs 
r.R4  •  I rMio 
::SM 
CSM'  .. 
CSM' 
CSM * levera!!e 
CSM'  .. 
* levera!!e 
r.SM if  ne,,,,tive * levera!!e 
Sale< p-rowth (]a"p-erl:  rv) 
Macro-economic  .. 
Real GNP !!rowth (\a!!!!ed: TV) 
1.1. 
N 
significant at  10% 
:lot: significant at 5% 
**"': significant at 1% 
P"rt I «ize in  t) 
Mnrl"IA  Mnrl,,1  R 
1.0697  11717 
_04070*  _04?0?* 
-0122~***  ~0.129J!*** 
0.3267  0.2044 
R.7740***  7.3972** 
_0 R7?0  -0433.9 
-16910  -41100 
_0 0?1R 
21017* 
-~ 00?0**  _~ 1",;,,*** 
-401R7***  -4091 R*** 
-~IO 171'  _11R  O'7~ 
235  235 
P"rt 2 (size in tnt,,1 ,,«et<) 
Mnrl,,1  A  Mnrl".IR  Mnrl,,1  Mnc\,,1  Mnc\,,1  < 
2.1709  4 R026  24R9R  17914  070) 
_0707?***  _0  ,,007***  _0 ",,""***  _0 ,,7R"***  _0 "".  *** 
-dl.1065  -01161  -010';4  -0 ????*  -OIR?? 
0.1415  0.0856  0.1477  -0011i1  0.0223 
6.4378**  5.3R75*  471RS*  .46';  **  4516?* 
_0  7R~"  -0 R044  -07?10  -0 ?R71i  -04411 
-0 <)74R  -2IR'l1  -4';040*  -? 'rwi  -4 RS4,,* 
0492R 






-? 07R"**  _~ II  R~***  ~2R2R'i**  -11?41***  -101i77**· 
-4 07~1***  -41160***  -10?RR***  -41410***  -1 01i?1 *** 
_'104',,,  _100  4""~  308.0944  -1071 R09  -1  07...2 R'iD_ 
235  235  235  235  235 
29 Table VI: Split Sample Regression Results for Model D - risk shifting incentives 
The sample period  is  1992-1999. All  data are obtained from  the Belgian National Bank.  Model D,  Part 2 from 
Table  V  is  estimated  for  different  subsamples,  depending  upon  the  severity  of risk  shifting  incentives.  The 
interaction variable industry/ailure risk * industry asset liquidity is used to classifY the firms in the sample. Firms 
with  a  value  below the  median «  50%)  are  compared  to  those  with a  value  above  the  median  (> 50%).  In 
addition, we also report results for firms with a value below the 40% and above the 60% percentile of the variable 
indusliJ'/ailure risk * industl)' asset liquidity. 
The  finn  level  variables  that  are  included  are measured  during the start-up  year,  whereas  the  industry  level 
variables are measured in the year preceding entry (1991). Firm start-up size is the  logarithm total assets, leverage 
is  the ratio of total  debt to  total  resources. scale economies are  proxied by the median of the  logarithm of total 
assets of finns older than ten years  in the corresponding four-digit NACE industry, entry rate is the  gross entry 
rate  in  the corresponding industry, size  distribution is the proportion of firms  that are  smaller than  the industry 
MES.  slink  costs  are  proxied  by  the  fraction  of total  assets  that  consist  of machinery  and  equipment in  the 
corresponding  industry,  CSM  measures  the  responsiveness  of marginal  profits  with  respect  to  changes  in 
competitors' output in the industry, sales growth is the one year lagged sales growth rate, which is allowed to vary 
over time and real GNP growth is the one year lagged growth rate in real GNP, which is also time varying (TV). 
ho (baseline exit rate) 
Firm level variables 
Start-up size 
Leverage 






CSM * leverage 
Sales growth (lagged; TV) 
Macro-economic conditions 
Real GNP growth (lagged; TV) 
LL 
N 
0  *. sIgnificant at  10 Yo 
>1<>/<:  signiJicanr (It 5% 
***: significant at 1  % 
Percentiles of  tlte variable 
Industry failure risk *  Industry asset liquidity 
<40%  <50%  >50%  >60% 
71.4299  168.7352  0.0153  0.5323 
-0.7465***  -0.7555***  -0.6802***  -0.5703*** 
-0.3403 *  -0.3342*  -0.1047  -0.3012 
0.0164  0.0222  0.5372***  0.2067 
-0.5984  -0.7217  6.7692*  9.9849* 
-4.8503  -5.6815*  1.3289  0.6779 
4.8780  6.3401  -6.3834  -5.9514 
3.3173  3.3487  -1.4358  -2.6893 
1.2407  1.1149  3.3163**  3.7426** 
-1.7024  -1.8929  -9.4643***  -10.0707*** 
-2.0386*  -4.5881 ***  -3.8681 ***  -4.2364*** 
-113.9271  -146.5645  -152.1333  -112.5647 
94  119  116  87 
30 Table VII: Split Sample Regression Results for Model D - risk shifting and/or underinvestment 
The sample period is  1992-1999. All data are  obtained from  the  Belgian National Bank.  Model D, Part 2 from 
Table V is estimated for different subsamples, depending upon the extent of  risk shifting and/or underinvestment 
incentives.  The interaction variable industry failure risk •  Industry growth opportunities is  used to classify the 
firms in the sample. Firms with a value below the median « 50%) are compared to those with a value above the 
median (> 50%). In addition, we also  report results  for firms with a value  below the 40% and above the 60% 
percentile of  the variable industry failure risk * Industry growth opportunities. 
The  firm  level  variables  that  are  included  are  measured  during  the  start-up  year,  whereas  the  industry  level 
variables are measured in the year preceding entry (1991). Firm start-up size is the logarithm total assets, leverage 
is  the ratio of total debt to total resources, scale economies are proxied by the median of the logarithm of total 
assets of firms older than ten  years in  the  corresponding four-digit NACE industry, entry rate is the gross entry 
rate in  the corresponding industry, size distribution is  the proportion of firms  that are smaller than the  industry 
MES,  slink  costs  are  proxied  by  the  fraction  of total assets  that  consist  of machinery and  equipment  in  the 
corresponding  industry,  CSM measures  the  responsiveness  of marginal  profits  with  respect  to  changes  in 
competitors' output in the industry, sales growth is the one year lagged sales growth rate, which is allowed to vary 
over time and real GNP growth is the one year lagged growth rate in real GNP, which is also time varying (TV). 
ho (baseline exit rate) 
Firm level variables 
Start-up size 
Leverage 






CSM * leverage 
Sales growth (lagged; TV) 
Macro-economic conditions 
Real GNP growth (lagged; TV) 
LL 
N 
,  .  0  . slgmficant at  10% 
**: significant at 5% 
***: signiticant at 1% 
Percentiles of  the variable 
Industry failure risk *  Industry growt" opportunities 
<40%  <50%  >50%  >60% 
85.3809  198.0998  0.0003  0.0043 
-0.6809***  -0.6862***  -0.7221 ***  -0.7357*** 
-0.3449*  -0.3509*  -0.0187  -0.0907 
-0.1118  -0.1381  0.7949**  0.5758" 
5.1259  6.7153  4.7566'  5.1434' 
-5.7921*  -6.5491 '  3.2434*  2.3046 
-3.0422  -0.2593  -5.6604  -3.2632' 
2.4502  1.3646  0.1833  0.6599 
1.5779  2.0342'  2.4035'  2.6731 * 
-1.2455  -2.0451  -11.4970***  -11.8040*** 
-4.0861 ***  -5.0990***  -3.0761 **  -3.2176* 
-115.8373  -149.0565  -149.8061  -122.2303 
93  118  117  95 
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